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Abstract
Deininger and Jin develop  a  model of land leasing with  endowments  but that land rental  markets  are  more
agents  characterized  by unobserved  heterogeneity  in  effective  in  doing so and also  have a  larger productivity-
ability and presence  of an off-farm labor market. In this  enhancing effect  than administrative  reallocation,
case, decentralized  land rental may contribute to equity  implying  that more active  land rental  markets would
and efficiency  goals and may have  several  advantages  allow producers to  realize significant  productivity gains.
over administrative  reallocation.  The extent to which this  At the  same time, the presence of a large  number  of
is true empirically  is explored using data from three of  producers  whose participation  in rental markets  remains
China's poorest provinces.  The authors find that both  constrained  suggests  that efforts to reduce  transaction
processes redistribute  land to those with lower  costs  in  land rental markets would  be warranted.
This paper-a product of Rural Development, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to assess
the impact of policy on land  markets.  Copies  of the paper are  available  free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Maria Fernandez,  room MC3-542, telephone  202-473-3766, fax 202-522-1151,
email  address  mfernandez2@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at
http://econ.worldbank.org.  Theauthorsmay be contacted at kdeininger@worldbank.orgorsjin@worldbank.org.  November
2002. (39 pages)
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Equity and efficiency  considerations in the Chinese land tenure system
Abstract:  We  develop  a  model  of land  leasing  with  agents  charactenzed  by  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  ability and
presence of an off-farm  labor  market.  In  this case,  decentralized  land rental  may contnbute to  equity and  efficiency  goals
and may have several  advantages  over administrative  reallocation  The  extent to which  this  is true empincally  is  explored
using  data  from  three of China's  poorest  provinces  We  find  that both  processes  redistrbute  land  to  those  with  lower
endowments  but  that land  rental  markets  are more  effective  in  doing  so  and  also  have  a  larger productivity-enhancing
effect  than  admrnistrative  reallocation  implying  that  more  active  land  rental  markets  would  allow  producers  to  realize
significant productivity  gains  At  the same  time, the presence of a large number of producers  whose participation  in rental
markets remains constrained  suggests that efforts to reduce transaction  costs in land rental markets would be warranted
1. Introduction
Given  the  importance  of  land  access  for  the  efficiency  of  agricultural  production  and  household
investment incentives,  how  land is distnbuted and the way in which markets  for land function will have
important implications  for food security and income growth, and thus the broader development process at
both the  household  and  the  national  level.  China  is of particular  interest  in  this  context  because  it is
characterized  by a  highly egalitarian  structure  of land  ownership  whereby,  after  the introduction  of the
household responsibility  system  in the late  1970s and early  1980s,  land was defacto allocated  on a per
capita basis (Brandt et al. 2002).  As a consequence,  and contrary  to what is found virtually everywhere  in
the world, the distribution of land in China is more  egalitarian than the distnbution  of income  and land
continues to perform an essential function  as a social  safety net.  Even though the land area  cultivated per
household is small  by intemational  comparison,'  the  fact  that every household  owns  enough land to at
least grow their own food in times of cnsis has a significant impact on the ability of households to smooth
consumption.  This has been credited as  a key factor in allowing China to achieve  much higher levels  in
terms  of human  development  indicators  (e.g.  infant  mortality,  stunting,  women's  literacy)  than  other
countries  at comparable levels  of economic  development  characterized  by more inegalitarian  structure  of
land ownership (Burgess, 2001).
While  the  benefits  from  an  egalitarian  land  ownership  distribution  are  widely  recognized,  whether
additional  interventions  by govemment  may be  needed  to maintain  the  equality  of opportunity  that  is
implied  in  such equal  access  to  the main non-labor  means  of production  is  an  issue  that has attracted
considerable  debate  among  researchers  as well  as  policy makers.  In  fact,  fears  that "market outcomes"
may undermine basic equity objectives  have led most villages in China to resort to periodic administrative
redistribution of land, a practice  that is viewed approvingly by a wide range of academics  and researchers
The average per capita land endowment  is less than  one mu (one fifteenth of a hectare), generally split up into about 9-10 parcels (Wen  1996).
2(Kung  1994; Dong  1996; Turner et al.  1998; Benjamin and Brandt  1998). In order to assess whether such
a practice may be justified or even  needed,  it is important to be aware of the altematives to administrative
reallocation of land and,  in addition to connparing  administrative  to market-based  land reallocation,  to be
able to construct  a realistic  counterfactual  to  administrative  intervention  in the land  market,  something
that has  proven  difficult  in  the  existing  literature.  In this  paper,  we  use  micro  data  from  about  1,000
households  in  three  of China's  poorest  provinces  to  explore  three  questions  relating to the  scope and
productivity impact of different  methods of land reallocation.
First,  we are  interested  to  find  out whether  concerns  about  potential  negative  equity  implications  from
"unchecked"  functioning  of land r  ental  markets are justified.  To do so, we  compare land rental  markets
and administrative  processes with in terms of the total amount of land they were  able to reallocate  and the
characteristics,  in terms of total land ownedl  and agricultural productivity,  of recipients.  We find not only
that,  in  terms  of quantity,  rental  markets  have  recently  become  more  important  than  administrative
reallocation, but also that markets  and administrative  mechanisms tend to transfer land to more productive
and  poorer households.  This would  suggest  that  there  is  little reason  to  be  concerned  about  potential
negative effects of the emergence  of rental markets as, with more and more off-farm  migration and non-
farm employment,  the need  for reallocation  of land  increases.  This conclusion  is reinforced  by the fact:
that, according  to our regressions,  land markets seem to be better than bureaucrats  in transferring land to
poor and more efficient producers,  i.e. those with small land endowments  and high levels of agricultural
ability, implying that such land markets  conbtibute to higher productivity  and greater equity.
A second question  is whether  land markets  allow households  to make  all the transactions  they desire  or
whether,  for example as  a result of transaclion  costs, some households  are either completely rationed out
of such markets  or are only able  to realize rnuch  less than  the desired number  of land transactions.  This
translates  inlo the  question  of determinants  of supply  of and  demand  for  land rental.  To  explore  this
question,  and  make  inferences  about  the  presence  and  extent of market imperfections  and  transaction
costs in these markets  as well  as  policies that could help reduce  them,  we  analyze  data on hypothetical
land  transactions  available  from  the  survey.  We  find  evidence  for  considerable  rationing  even  at the
prevailing  rental price as the amount of land that villagers  would want to exchange is consistently  highe:r
than what  is actually  observed.  Irn  fact, non-parametric  regressions  confirm that  the difference  between
desired  and  actual  participation  in  land rental  markets  increases  with  households'  agricultural  ability,
suggesting  that reducing  rationing  would  ]lead  to clear  improvements  in productivity.  A closer  look at
household  specific  and  village  level  factors  that  affect  participation  in  rental  markets  helps  uncover
potential areas  for policy  intervention.  It reveals  that whether land rental  is allowed  at the village  level,
the dependence  of the  village  economy on agriculture,  possession  of non-agricultural  assets,  past rental
3experience,  and village  level activity of rental markets all increase  the scope for rental markets,  in terms
of participation  as  well  as  area  transacted.  Analysis  of the  characteristics  of households  which  are
constrained  on  the  supply  side  of  the  market  reveals  that  eliminating  obstacles  to  rental  market
participation, for example through clanfication of rental rights  at the village level will allow younger and
more productive  households with higher level of agricultural assets but no migration  experience to access
land,  something that would clearly increase overall productivity.
If,  as  asserted  above, better  functioning  of rental  markets  will  enhance both  productivity  and  equity,  it
would be of great interest to quantify the associated  impacts. To do so, we simulate the changes in output
net of vanable  production  cost that could be realized  from better functioning  of land markets.  We find
that, even without changes in rental rates, realization of all desired transactions would double the share of
producers participating  in rental  markets to almost 25%  and participating  producers would increase their
level of agricultural  production by almost 70%. Reduction of rental rates by one third would have an even
more  dramatic effect;  the share of producers participating  in rental markets would increase to almost 40%
and the increase  in social welfare  would amount to five  times what is currently  realized.  Comparing the
social benefits that could be achieved by improved  functioning of land rental markets to the gains realized
from  administrative  reallocation,  illustrates  the  potential  importance  of rental  markets.  Unconstrained
rental  markets  would be  associated  with  a more  than nine-fold  increase  in social  benefits with  another
tripling of these benefits  from reduced rental  prices.  As  the scope for exchanges  of land  increases  with
development  of the off-farn  economy,  higher  levels  of education,  and increased  accumulation  of non-
farm  assets,  it  will  be  more  and  more  difficult  to  rely  on  direct  redistribution  as  the  sole  means  to
maintain  an optimal  operational  land distribution.  In this context, measures  to improve the functioning of
rental  markets  could  help  to  increase  productivity  and  ensure  that  China's  equitable  land  ownership
distribution will be most efficiently utilized.
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  two  reviews  the  literature  and  develops  a model  and  an
estimation  strategy  to  analyze  land  rental  market  decisions  in a  framework  with  off-farm  employment
opportunities,  transaction  costs, and unobserved  agricultural  ability.  Section three  discusses  data sources
and  provides  evidence  on  descnptive  statistics  as  well  as the  distribution  of agricultural  ability  across
producers.  Section four discusses  empirical results  by comparing  the determinants  of administrative  and
market-based  land reallocations,  assessing  the factors  underlying hypothetical  market participation,  and
quantifying  the gains  from better functioning  of land rental markets.  Section five concludes  with policy
implications.
4:2.  Backgrounid and conceptual  model
While  the  literature  has  long  emphasized  the  importance  of a possible  investment  disincentive  effect
derived  from insecure  land tenure,  relatively  less  attention has been devoted  to  the allocative  impact of
land  tenure  arrangements.  Focusing  on  the  latter  may  be  important  not  only  because  accumulating
empincal  evidence  suggests  that the  magnitude  of the investment  disincentive  effect may be  small  but
also  because  adjustments  through  markets  are  likely to  become  more  important  as the rural  non-farm
economy  develops and households  increasingly migrate to urban areas.  To do so, we develop a model of
agricultural  production  and  land  rmarket  participation  that  allows  us  to derive  comparative  statics  and
hypotheses that can be tested with our data.
2.1 Investmeint and allocative dimensions  o' land tenure
'We  distinguish  two main  channels  through which  land redistribution  could affect productive  efficiency
and household welfare: an investment disincentive effect;  and an allocative effect.
According  to  the investment disincentive effect,  which  has received by far the  greatest  attention in the
literature,  the scope for continuing redistribution  of land is likely to adversely affect investment incentives
because  households  would not invest  in  lancl that might be  expropriated  after the  investment has been
made  (Besley  1995). The presence  and magnitude of such an effect has been studied in a large literature
on virtually e very continent (Soule et al., 2000; Fearnside  2001; Place and Otsuka 2001; Place and Migot-
Adholla  1998;  Binswanger  et  al.  1995;  Btruce  and  Migot-Adholla  1994;  Feder  and  Onchan  1987).
]Recently,  a  number  of  contributions  have  explored  how  land  tenure  security  may  affect  land-related
investment  in  China  (Li  et  al.,  1998;  Brandt  et al.,  2002;  Jacoby  et  al.,  2001).  The majority  of these
studies finds  that better definition of land rights does increase  producers  propensity to invest but that the
imagnitude  of  such  investment  is  quite  small.  There  are  two main  reasons  that  might  underlie  such  a
finding.  On the  one hand, partly  clue  to depiressed  prices for agricultural  output, returns  to  agricultural
cultivation  are  currently  quite  low  implying  that,  even  with  higher  levels  of tenure  security  and  the
associated  increased returns to investment,  it may not be profitable  to undertake  such investment (Kung
1995). On the other hand, it may be that, with community-based  mechanisms to secure  property rights to
[land-related  investments  at the local  level, the added security provided by formalization of such property
rights  may  be  limited.  This  would  be  reinforced  by  the  fact  that investment  is undertaken  mostly  on
upland  and  undeveloped  "wasteland"  which,  by  definition,  is  not  subject  to redistribution  by  village
authorities.  Sach  an explanation  would be consistent  with experience  from  other countries where,  even
though land can not  be owned  individually.,  individual property  rights to land-related improvements  are
universally recognized,  very secure,  and can  lbe enforced at relatively low cost (Platteau 2000). Although
this does not imply that institutions to  check  village leaders'  abuses of their ability  to redistribute  land
5would  not be needed  (Huang  1999),  it  suggests  that -in  view  of villages'  apparent  ability to  deal  with
these issues  in  a  satisfactory manner-  focusing attention  on the investment-impact  of efforts  to enhance
the security of property rights alone is unlikely to bring about large increases in productivity.
A  second  set  of concerns  revolves  around  the allocative impact  of land  redistribution.  The  underlying
idea  is that, in  a dynamic  economic  environment  that is  characterized  by  increasing  levels  of off-farm
employment  and rural-urban migration,  transfer rights are likely to become  more important in the future
(Carter  and  Yao  1999a).  Therefore,  and  irrespectively  of the  ownership  distribution  of land,  efficient
mechanisms to transfer  land from less to more  efficient producers  would become increasingly  important
to  ensure  an  efficiency-maximizing  operational land  distnbution.  2 Administrative  processes  of
reallocation are normally  slow, associated  with high transaction  costs, infrequent,  and possibly subject to
bureaucratic  inefficiencies  and  rent-seeking  behavior  (Johnson  1995).  Moreover,  even in a closely  knit
and  purely  agrarian  economy,  it  is  unlikely  that  village  leaders  will  be  able  to  observe  individual
cultivators'  agricultural  ability  and  allocate  land  accordingly  in  a  productivity-maximizing  way.  As  a
consequence,  administrative means may be ill-suited to respond to the demand for productivity-enhancing
re-allocations  of land  that  is  needed  with  broader  economic  development.  Even though  market-based
transactions  may not  be  costless  either,  it  would  be  of great  importance  to  compare  the potential  of
markets to that of administrative reallocation.
In  fact, knowledge  about  the functioning  of these  markets  and their  equity  and productivity  impacts  is
quite  limited.  Studies  indicate  that many  villagers  express  a desire  for  administrative  redistribution  in
order to re-establish  "appropriate"  land-labor  ratios  (Kung and  Liu  1997;  Kung  2000),  suggesting that
there are still many mis-perceptions  about  the scope  for land rental market operation.  Partly as a result of
such misperceptions and continuing interventions, rental markets do not function well (Yao 2000). In fact,
it is often noted that renting out of land would be seen by the village leaders as a signal that expropriation
of the land for subsequent reallocation to other villagers would be  feasible (Yao,  1996).
2.2 A model of agricultural production and land market participation
Suppose  household  i  is  endowed  with  a  vector  of household  characteristics  X (excluding  agricultural
ability),  endowments  of labor  L,  and cultivated  land A, and  agricultural  production  ability  a,  Assume
that  there  is  no  farm  labor  market  but  that  households  have  the  opportunity  to  allocate  their  labor
2 It is  intuitive and  easy to show analytically that, in the presence of large unobserved  heterogeneity  across producers,  maintaining an  egalitarian
operational  distribution  of  land  could  be  hugely  inefficient.  Well-functioning  rental  markets  would,  in  such  a  context,  be  strictly  Pareto
improving  as the rental  received  by infra-marginal  households  who decide to rent out would be higher than what they could receive from own
cultivation.  Effective  rental  markets  would  thus  help  to combine  the  equity  benefits  of an egalitarian  land  ownership  distribution  with  the
efficiency advantages of  an  "optimal" operational distnbution of land.
6endowment between  farming or, their own plot and non-farming activities  at a given wage w(X),  and that
there  are no  restrictions  on renting of land.  This  implies that household  incomes  can derive from three
sources,  farm,  off-farm  and  rental  incorrLes.  Let  household  i's  agricultural  production  function  is
characterized  as  af(7h 0,A)  where l, represents  labor  used in agricultural  production,  and Ai, land used  in
agricultural  production.  To simplify  the exposition,  we drop the  subscript  i in the subsequent discussion
Let  f  satisfy  the  standard  assumptions:  f,.  > 0,  fA  >0  °  fla  <0  f  fAA  < O,  f,aA  > 0  and
fl.l.  f A A  hfjA  >  0
[f the land rental  market  is perfect,  that is households  face a competitively  deterrnined  rental rate r and
ithere is no transaction cost associated with renting in and renting out, household i will choose  la as well as
A by solving 1the maximization problem:
Ma  pa,  f(  ),  ,A,) + w  -- (4-A,)r  (a)
where p is the price of agricultural goods, I' is the amount of time allocated to off-farm labor (= L, -10)
and all other variables  are  as defined  above.  Note also that,  for any household,  A,  - A,  > 0 implies net
renting out  arid  A,  - A,  < 0 implies net renting  in.  The optimal  choices of lia,  1,"  and A,* will solve  the
first order conditions  (FOC) of problem (a), i.e.
pa  f,,  (,,a,Ai)  =  w  (1)
palfA  (  (li,A,  )  = r  (2)
The interpretation  of these FOC is  intuitive:  Households  will choose  the amount of labor to be used  on
and off-farm,  Iaf  1,°*,  and  the amount of area  to be  cultivated,  A,,  so  that the marginal  return to labor
equals the wage rate and the marginal  return  to land equals to the market rental rate.  It is, however, more
realistic  that rental markets  are  not perfect,  i.e.  that renting in  and renting  out land is  associated with a
transaction cost, i.e. households renting  in land will pay more and those renting out will receive less than
the competitive rental rate r. Without loss of generality we assume  the transaction  cost to be independent
of the area rented and amount to a fixed amoant T that has to be incurred  equally by those renting in and
renting out. With such transaction costs, households who would have participated in rental markets earlier
will now remain  in autarky.  The  equilibrium  conditions  for  those people  who will only  cultivate  their
enndowment  and not participate  in rental markets are:
7r - T < pa,fA(l,a,Aj)  < r  + T  (4)
These conditions  define the existence of two cut-off points in terms of households'  agricultural ability,  a,
and a",,  such that households  with a, e  [a,; a"] will not participate in land markets.  Households with a, <
a, will continue to rent out land with the amount of land rented satisfying the new FOC:
Pa,fi  ,.  (li  , Ai)  = w  (5)
pa,fA(l,,AAi)  =r -T  (6)
Similarly,  households  with a,> a, will continue to rent in land from others and their decision rules follow
their respective modified FOC:
pa,fa  (Ia ,Ai)  =  w  (7)
paifA(l,a,Ai)=r+T  (8)
Based  on  condition  (5)  - (8),  we  can  derive  three  propositions  (see  appendix  for  a  more  detailed
derivation).
Proposition  1.  The amount  of land rented in is strictly increasing  in households'  agricultural  ability,  a,
and strictly decreasing  in their land  endowment  A  . To the degree  that, in an agrarian  economy,  land is
the main source of wealth, rental markets would therefore transfer land to "poor but efficient"  producers.
To the extent that village leaders  do not observe a  (or base their reallocation  decisions  on criteria  other
than productive  efficiency), we would expect that land rental markets would do so more  effectively  than
administrative  reallocation, something that will be explored in the empirical analysis.  -
Proposition  2. Presence of transaction costs drives a wedge between those renting in and those renting out
with  any increase  in  T decreasing  a, and increasing  a",  thereby expanding  the range of producers  who
remain  in autarky,  reducing the number of households  who  participate  in rental  markets,  as well as the
amount of land transacted  through rental markets.  Compared to the perfect market case this would imply
lower social welfare, with the extent of losses increasing  in the dispersion of  cx across producers.
r-T  _  r+T  a
Pfa  - - . u  a  - where  1/  can  be  solved f)om equation  (3).
8Proposition  3.  Increases  in  the  exogenously  given  wage  for  off-farm  employment  will  increase  the
amnount of land transacted  in rental markets by increasing  the amount rented  out by households with low
agricultural ability (who join the off-farm labor force) and the amount rented in by those with high-ability
(who  specialize  in  agricultural  production).  'Tlis will be  associated  with a  decrease  in the  equilibrium
rental rate which, in a risk-free environment,  wvi 11  make everybody better off.
Z.3 Estimation strategy and methodology
.4dministrative vs. market-based land reallocation: It has become  commonplace  in the literature to view
markets  and  administrative  modes  of land  ieallocation  as  two  means  to  achieve  the  same  goal  (e.g.
Lohmar  et al.  2001;  Carter  and  Yao  1999b;  ]Liu  et  al.  1999;  Benjamin  and  Brandt  1999).  There  has,
however,  been  comparatively  little empirical  research  on  this  subject.  Our data  allow  us  to perform  a
direct  companson  of the  functioning  of these  two  mechanisms,  especially  the extent  to which  each  of
them  enhances  efficiency  or  equity  and  whether  there  are  any  possible  trade-offs  between  these  two
objectives.  Such trade-offs might arise if strong economies  of scale would lead the unfettered operation of
markets to consolidate land whereas  administbative reallocation might accomplish the opposite. While the
presence  of  increasing  returns  to  scale  and  the  resulting  tendency  towards  consolidation  has  been
mentioned repeatedly  in the literature  on Chinese agriculture  (Fleisher et al.  1992; Zhou 2000),  existing
evidence  is  arnbiguous  and  rarely  based  on  micro  data.  Benjamin  and  Brandt  (1998)  suggest  that
reallocation of land could provide large efficiency gains and that some of these gains are realized through
administrative  reallocation but they  were  unable to compare administrative  reallocation  to market based
reallocation.
To  explore  this issue,  we  specify  a reduced  form regression  for receipt  of land through  reallocation as
well  as  for  participation  in  land  rental  rnarkets  (either  renting  in  or renting  out).  Key right hand  side
variables  included  relate  to  a  household's  agricultural  productivity,  its endowments  of land,  labor,  and
other factors oi  production,  the off-farm  opportunities  available, and the transaction  costs associated with
land rental.  Formally, we estimate
R, =  f/o +/8,a,  +  qX  +  SO,  + YT,  +,  (9)
where  R, is  a  dummy  for  renting  in/out  or  the  actual  amount  of area  rented  in/out,  a,  is  household
agricultural  ability, Xi is the vector of other household  characteristics  including its  land endowment  and
its  level  of agricultural  and  non-agricultural  assets,  Oi  denotes  the  off-farm  opportunities  available  to
household  i, and  T, is  a  vector of characteristuwcs  affecting  the transaction  cost of land rental  (including
rental  experience  in earlier  years  and the  level of activity of the rental market  at the village  level).  By
replacing  Ri with a  dummy of whether  or not land was  received  through reallocation  or the  amount  of
9such  land  received,  we  can  estimate  similar  regressions  for  the  other  outcome  variables  of interest  as
explained in more detail below.
A parameter  of key interest  is  the coefficient  86  on  a;, household i's level of agricultural  ability. To the
extent that  such ability  can not be transferred  in  markets,  we would  expect  that,  holding  other factors
constant,  fi >0,  i.e.  markets  transfer  land  to  producers  with  higher  ability.  The  vector  X  includes
household characteristics  such  as per capita land endowment,  the number of members by age group, the
level  of agricultural  assets,  and the age  and education of the household  head.  Note that these  will also
affect the wage rate  that can be  obtained  in the market.  Even though the history of land reallocation  in
China  implies  that there  is  less  dispersion  in  per capita  land  endowments  than  in  other  countries,  we
would  expect the  coefficient  on  the land endowment  to be negative,  implying that  land rental  markets
transfer  land  to  those  with  lower  levels  of endowments.  Also,  while  the  amount  of agricultural  asset
ownership  would be irrelevant  if markets for such assets  were perfect, the existence of imperfections  in
these  markets,  especially  with  respect  to  draft animals,  is well  established  (Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin
1987),  leading us to expect that households  with higher levels of asset ownership  will be more  likely to
rent  in  land.  Finally,  in  line  with  the  literature  (e.g.  Reardon  et  al.  2001),  we  expect  that  off-farm
opportunities  improve with the household's  level of educational  attainment, the  stock of non-agricultural
fixed assets owned,  and with past migration  or off-farm job experience.  As, in terms of our model, better
off-farm opportunities  are equivalent  to a higher wage rate,  we  expect the  coefficients  on variables that
improve  such  opportunities  to  be  negative  and  positive  in  the  renting  in  and  renting  out equations,
respectively.
To proxy for availability  of off-farm  opportunities  beyond the household  level, we  include  two village
level variables, namely the share of households whose main source of income is agriculture,  and the mean
per capita level of income  in the village.  Both will,  according to our model,  increase  the amount of land
transacted  through  rental  markets  and  decrease  the  equilibrium rental  rate.  Thus  we would  expect  the
coefficients  on these  variables  to be positive.  Also,  we  include  the share of households participating  in
rental markets (excluding the household under concern)  at the village level as a measure of the transaction
costs  faced  by potential  participants  in  such markets.  The  rationale  is that in  villages  where  rental  is
already practiced, the institutions and norms to facilitate  a functioning rental market are already available
and it is likely to be easier for households  to obtain information  on rental prices and other characteristics
of relevance  for such markets.  Even  though partly endogenous,  past participation  in rental  markets  will
allow households  to build a reputation and become acquainted with the processes involved.  Therefore we
would expect the coefficient  to be positive in both renting in and renting out equations.
10ro  facilitate  comparison  between  administrative  and  market-based  reallocation  of land,  we  repeat  the
same equations (excluding parameters relating to past involvement in land rental markets) for households'
receipt of land through  administrabve  mechanisms.  Unfortunately the data set does  not contain sufficient
observations of households  who lost land through reallocation,  implying that we restrict attention to those
who received  land through administrative  means.
Assessing  the  potential for  market  operation and potential obstacles:  Changing  R,  from  real  to
hypothetical  renting decisions  (both  participation  and  the desired  amount of land  transacted)  will  allow
one to identif  characteristics  that increase hoaseholds demand for renting in as well as renting out and at
the same  time  to  identify  characteristics  comnmon to households  whose  participation  in such  markets  is
constrained.  I)oing  so  would  help  to  assess  the  extent  to  which  markets  are  currently  realizing  their
potential, poirmt out measures that could help them to do so more fully, and identify those who are likely to
gain from suc h better market functioning.
In our model,  there are  two main factors that drive market  participation;  one is  the exogenous  wage rate
Emd the second one is ability. Better functionilng  of markets  (or a reduction in transaction  costs) would be
predicted  to  increase  the  amount  rented  oul  by those  with low  agricultural  ability  while increasing  the
amount rented  in by high ability individuals.  Also, to the extent that higher levels  of education,  a history
of off-farm  eimployment,  and  possession  of  non-agricultural  enterprise  assets would  increase  the  wage
rate an individual  could obtain outside the agricultural sector, we would expect these variables  to mcrease
supply  of land  to  the  market  and  reduce  lhe  propensity  to  rent in  land.  A  second  issue  with  policy
elevance  is that the data on desired land rental participation  allows one to identify potential factors that
lead  to  households being  constrained.  To  the  extent  that  these  are  amenable  to  policy  at the  local  or
central level, this would have immediate policy implications.
Benefits from  increased land marA-et activiJy: While  our model  predicts  that  better functioning  of land
markets would enhance overall productivity., empirical evidence  on the magnitude  of the impact of better
fiunctioning  of markets  on  overall  production  is needed  to  assess  whether  this  is  an issue  of potential
policy relevance.  To  denve  a conservative  estimate  of the magnitude  of such a  gain  in  production,  we
predict households'  participation  in rental  markets  under  different  scenarios  (i.e.  the  actual  situation;  a
hypothetical  unconstrained  situation,  and a  siituation with  reduced  rental rates),  assume  they rent in the
mean area observed in the sample,  and predict production with no other changes in other factors but with
profits  re-calculated  to adjust for the proportionally  higher amount of other inputs used.4 Comparing the
amount and value produced under this scenario to the original  situation allows one to assess the increase
4 Note that this will  yield a conservative  estimate as use of the cobit model  would imply that, for example,  more productive  farmers would rent in
a larger area  The same would be true if households were to make some changes  in other factors  (e g. by purchasing new equipment)
IIin overall production that can be realized  through such an exchange. By subtracting  the mean rental rate
for paddy land and the cost of other matenal inputs, i.e.,  fertilizer, seed, pesticide, hired labor, etc., we can
also  assess  how this net  gain  is distnbuted  between  the different  factors of production  and thus  make
inferences  on the welfare impact of such a policy change.5
3. Data and descriptive statistics
Our  data combine  a specific  survey on agricultural  production, the history of land endowments  and off-
farm participation,  and  credit access  with panel information  from the regular  SSB household  survey  for
the  same  households.  They  illustrate  the  rapid  evolution  of land  rental  markets  and  the  existence  of
considerable  rationing on both the  supply and the demand side of this market. Derivation  of a measure of
agricultural  ability,  in the  form of an  efficiency  parameter,  for producers included  in the sample points
towards considerable  variation in such ability and thus a scope for land markets to improve productivity.
3.1 Data sources
The data used  in the study are from two main  sources. One is a household  survey conducted by the Rural
Survey  Team  of China's  State  Statistical  Bureau  (SSB)  jointly  with the  China  Center  for Economic
Research,  the  World  Bank,  and  the  University  of Wisconsin,  in May  and June  of 2001.  This  survey
covered  1001  households  from  110  villages  in  three  of China's  poorest  provinces,  namely  Guizhou,
western  Hunan  and  Yunnan.  These  provinces  are  not only  characterized  by  significant  differences  in
tenure rules and the length of time for which use nghts are assigned but also the extent of out-migration
(Deininger  and Jin,  2001).  Over and above  the  variables  included  in standard  multi-purpose  household
surveys (household characteristics,  expenditures, assets,  income  sources, and agricultural production), the
survey  included  detailed  information  on  the  initial  land  endowment  and  changes  therein  through
administrative  reallocation,  land rental  markets,  and other non-market  processes  (e.g. inheritance).  This
allows us to compare the current importance of these different channels but also to make inferences on the
evolution  of these markets in the past. We also  obtained information on hypothetical participation in land
rental and sales markets,  at the village rental rate, as well as lower or higher prices,  in order to identify not
only  constraints  to  land  rental  market participation  but also to  assess  the possible impact  of improved
functioning  of land rental  markets  on agncultural  production.  The  second source  of data is a three-year
panel of the  SSB's standard household  expenditure  survey which,  during the  1997  to  1999 period, was
conducted on the same set of households  for which the more detailed production data are available. While
the  main  focus  of this  survey  is  on  a  detailed  recording  of households'  expenditure,  it also  provides
5 Again,  since  a large  share  of the  land  rented  is  actually  upland  rather than  paddy  land,  use  of the  rental  rate  for  paddy  land  is likely to
12information  on  a  wide  range  of other  variables,  especially  households'  endowment  of key  assets.  An
additional  use  of these data  for our purposes  is  the derivation  of a measure  of households'  productive
efficiency,  by  estimating  a fixed  effect production  function  and recovering  household  fixed effects  as
explained in more detail below.
3.2 Descriptive  statistics on households'  land market participation
Descriptive  statistics on land distribution before  and after land reallocation,  and before  and after real and
desired renting  activity,  is reported  mn  Table  2  The  data indicate that land rental  mrarkets  have emerged
rapidly over the last years;  historical  information  on land rental market participation  indicates  that  such
markets had been  rirtually  non-existent  '  years ago but are now utilized  by almosi  10%  of households.
W'ith an additional  3%  of households  receivingi  land for free, this implies  that decentralized  exchange  of
land has become an important element in  Chia.'s rural economy.
Levels  of actual  and  desired  participation  in  rental  markets  vary  across  provinces;  from  about  6%  in
Guizhou,  compared  to about  14%  in  the  other  two  province,  a difference  that narrows  only  slightly (to
17% vs  31%)  if hypothetical  rental  is considered.  Still,  even  in provinces  where land redistribution has
traditionally  been  the main  form  of adjusting  to population  growth,  rental  is now  quantitatively  more
important than administrative  reallocation as a way to adjust land area to population  size. Even in Hunan,
the  province  where  administrative  reallocationi  is the most prevalent  in  the sample,  the area  transacted
through rental  in 2000 is almost  50%7o  higher than what had been reallocated  administratively  over the  6-
year period from  1995 to 2001.6
MThile  this poinits to a high level  of rental  markcet  activity, households'  answers to hypothetical questions
on  rental  market  behavior  suggest  i:hat  important  barriers  to rental  market  participation  persist.  Asked
whether  they  would  be  willing  to  rent  in  land  at  the  going  village  rental  rate  (which  was  obtained
independently  from village  leaders), more than double of the households who currently rent in land (23%)
indicated  that  they would  be willing  to  do.  With a reduction of rental  rates by one  third, another  12%
would be  willing to  do  so,  bringing  the  overall  share of renting  households to  35%.  A non-parametric
illustration  of the  amount of land which  producers  would  be  willing  to  demand  from the  market,  as a
fimction of owned land, is illustrated  in figure  [.
This suggests that land reallocation through administrative means and operation of rental markets may not
necessarily be incompatible with each other.  Both in terms of quantity of land transacted  and the number
overestimate  the transfer from the renter to the landlord,  thus caLising us to underestimate the welfare gain  for the former
6 Only 0.23 mu of arable land was actually rented  in on average for the entire  sample, compared to 0 69  mu and 1 5 mu that would be willing to
be rented  in  at current or  1/2 of current rental rate  Hunan  has  most active real  rental market, 22%  households  in  Hunan rented  in  land in 2000
and 0 57 mu of land on average were rented  in.  By contrast, only  8% of households in Guizhou rented in land in 2000 and the amount rented in is
0  17 mu.
13of participants,  land rental  markets have  emerged  as  the main  form of land reallocation  even  in  areas
where  administrative  reallocation  is  widespread.  The  fact  that Hunan,  which  experienced  the highest
incidence of land reallocation  (with 24% of households  affected as compared  to 0.7% in Guizhou and 3%
in Yunnan),  also has the most active rental market  suggests that, instead, both may be driven by the same
set  of  underlying  factors,  in  particular  a  more  active  off-farm  market.  It  could  also  imply  that
administrative  means  are  increasingly  unable  to handle  the  increased  volume  of reallocation  needed  to
ensure  optimal use of a village's land resource.  Finally, the fact that rental  activity  is lowest in Guizhou,
the first province to introduce  longer-term property rights to land, suggests that, at least prima  facie, land
rental does not depend  on improved or better enforceable  property rights.  All of these hypotheses will be
explored in more detail below.
High levels  of demand  for renting  in  land can indicate  a  generalized  scarcity  of land at the local  level,
rather  than  the  scope  for  productivity-improving  redistribution.  To  explore  this  issue,  we  complement
figures  on willingness  to rent in with ones on the scope  for renting  out. Not surpnsingly  in view of the
fact that some  of those  renting out may have temporarily  migrated out of the village and the  sampling
procedures  employed,7 we find that the  share of  "landlords"  is only about half of that of renters.  At the
same time, the  data suggest that  14%  of households would be willing to rent out land at  current rental
prices while another 12% would want to do so with an  increase of land rentals by 33%.  The fact that the
mean  amount of area households  would be willing to rent out increases even more (in percentage  terms)
than  the  area  they  would  like  to  rent  in  indicates  that  the  low  level  of transactions  observed  is  not
primanly  due to  low supply.8 In addition to  reinforcing  the importance  of transaction  costs,  this  would
also lead one to expect considerable  increases  in land rental activity  in the future,  especially as the non-
agricultural economy develops.
3.3 Determining agricultural ability
A key  vanable  in  our model  and in terms  of the impact of land markets  on efficiency  of production  is
households'  level  of agricultural  ability.  To recover  this  variable,  we  make  use  of the  availability  of
household  level  panel  data on production.  Let  all  households  use  the  same  Cobb-Douglas  technology
represented by the production  function
Q,i,  = exp(a1 +a,)Aji,  'L  ,  2 K,i,  63  (10)
7To reduce  the probability that a household  will drop out of the sample, the SSB sample excludes households who are likely to live outside of the
village for a long time  This leads to a reduced probability of observing  households who rent out land.
' The mean amount of area households actually rented out or would be wiling to rent out would be much bigger if we were  able to include those
who rented out all their land  and lived outside.
14where  Q,,, is agricultural  output produced by producer i in village] in year t; A,,b  L,,, and K,,, are land, labor
and capital used by producer  i in villagej in  year t to produce output  Q,  and exp(c,+aX)  is the efficiency
parameter  which has a household-  and a village-specific  element.9 91,  92. and 03 are technology coefficients
common to all producers.  Taking logs of bolb sides of equation (10), adding a time trend and an iid. error
term,  and letting q be the  log of output,  a, 1, and k be the log of the inputs,  and  tZ,  =  a 3 +a,, we obtain  an
estimable  equation for production by producer  i in villagej at time t as follows.
q,,, =  aji +  OJaj,, + 62 lj,, +  03 ,k,, +  t  + ej,,  (lOa)
Akvailability of multiple observations  per household in the panel allows us to estimate  this equation using
household fixed effects.
q,,, - ,,=  ,-  ai, +  9(Z  -Z,,)  d+  0 t-i  t)  + (it  - )  (l Ob)
where Z is a vector consisting  of a, 1,  k and () is a coefficient vector including 0,  O. and 03. The composite
efficiency parameter  a, 1 can then be recovered  for each producer.  Obviously,  this parameter will include
other unobservable  characteristics  rnany of which are village-specific.  To purge these, we apply a similar
procedure at the  village level which  allows us to obtain  a. which can be used to obtain an estimate of a,
for each producer  in the sample.
A graphical  representation  of the estimates of a, for different provinces  is provided  in figure 3, with the
normal  distribution plotted  for purposes  of comparison.  Note  that  our  model  would  predict that  better
functioning  cof  land  rental  markets,  possibly  together  with  off-farm  opportunities,  would  reduce  the
observed  dispersion of ability. Indeed,  we find that the dispersion  of ability is greatest  in Guizhou where
rental markets  are  least  active and  smallest  in Hunan  where  both rental  and off-farm  labor  markets are
quite  active.  Correlation  coefficients  between  a and  some of the  household  charactenstics  of interest
suggest  that  agricultural  ability  is  significantly  and  positively  correlated  with  education  (p =  0.10),
cultivated  area  (p = 0.10),  and  farm  and  nion-farm  assets  (p =  0.18  and p =  0.09,  respectively).  It is
negatively correlated with past migration by the household head (p= -0.08).
4. Econometric evidence
We find that in our sample, markets transfer land to small but efficient producers in a way that is, as far as
productive  efficiency is concemed,  superior to administrative reallocation  or, with respect to equity, equal
to it . Higher  levels of diversification  and non-agricultural  activity contribute  to the  development of such
The latter is likel y  to be related to infrastructure  and markel,  soil  quality,  climate, and other village level charactenstics
15markets  and  removal  of other  obstacles  to  their  functioning  could  have  a  very  beneficial  impact.  An
attempt  at quantification of these gains  suggests that unconstrained  operation  of rental markets  at current
or reduced rentals  would  allow for an  increase in participation  between  four-  and six-fold, respectively,
with the gains for those producers who participate increasing  almost three-fold.
4.1  Comparing market and non-market based adjustments
Table 2 reports the results of companng  the determinants  of receiving  land through either administrative
mechanisms  or through  the land  rental market.  Columns  (1) and  (4)  include  results of probit  and  tobit
regressions  for  administrative  reallocation,  while  the  remainder  of the  columns  reports  regressions  for
land market participation.  To account  for policy, we include,  in addition to standard  vanables,  a dummny
variable  indicating  whether,  according  to households'  responses  in the community survey, land rental is
allowed at  the  village  level  (columns  2,  3, 5, and  6).  In columns  3 and  6, we  further  include  vanables
referring to past rental market experience,  either at the village or the household level,  as a proxy  for lower
transaction  costs  (e.g.  with respect  to information  or enforcement  of contracts).  There  are  a number  of
results of interest.
First,  the  direction  in  which  land  is  redistributed,  namely  from households  with higher  endowments  to
those with lower ones, is very similar between administrative  reallocation and land rental. As indicated by
the negative  sign and high statistical  significance of households'  land endowment in all regressions,  both
processes  increase the amount  of land  available  to  the land-poor.  This  can allay  fears  that,  for  example
due  to  the  presence  of economies  of scale,  liberalization  of land  rental  markets  would  lead  to  land
concentration  and leave the poor without access  to land. On  the contrary,  the  fact that the  coefficient  on
per  capita  land  endowment  is  much  larger  in  column  (2)  than  in  colunm  (I)  suggests  that,  quite
surprisingly,  markets  are  more  effective  than  administrative  processes  of reallocation  in  allowing  poor
producers  to gain  access to land.  Comparing  this with the  tobit regression  suggests  that village  leaders
transfer larger areas,  something that would be in line with the presence of relatively high fixed costs in the
case of administrative reallocation which lead to land being re-allocated in larger and lumpy chunks.
A second finding of interest  is that both markets and administrative reallocation  transfer land to producers
with  higher  levels  of ability,  thereby  promoting  productive  efficiency.  However,  and  in  line  with  our
hypothesis  that it is more difficult  for a "central planner"  or village leaders  to observe producers'  ability
than  for  decentralized  market  processes,  both  the  magnitude  and  significance  of the  respective
coefficients  suggest that market-based processes are supenor to administrative redistribution  as concerns
the  transfer  of land  to  more  efficient  producers.  For  administrative  reallocation,  the  coefficients  on
producers'  ability,  while positive and significant at the  5%  level,  are of very low magnitude in the probit
equation  (column  1) and  insignificant  in  the  tobit  equation  (column  4).  By  companson,  for  markets,
16coefficients  in both  the tobit and the probit equations  (columns  2,  5, and 3, 6, respectively)  are not only
signiificant at the  1%  level but, more importantly,  significantly larger than for redistribution.
To  interpret  the rnagnitude  of the coefficients,  we  compare  the probability  of participation  between  the
least  efficient  and  the  most efficient  producer in  the  sample,  holding  everything  else constant.  With a
difference  of only  3 percentage  points, the chance  of the  most efficient producer  receiving land  through
reallocation  is  almost identical  to  that of the least  efficient  one.  By comparison,  the  probability  of the
most efficient producer receiving  land in rental  rmarkets is between 24%  (column  3)  and 33%  (column  2)
percentage  points  higher  than  that  for  the  least  efficient  producer.  Clearly,  if productive  use  of the
economy's resources  is a concem, greater  reliance on rental markets  as compared  to central planning at
the village level appears to be a prudeni: choice.
Given that administration  of land rights  in China Is highly decentralized,  the extent to which temporary or
permanent transfers  are allowed is decided at the  village level. To assess whether limitations on the ability
to transact land may affect observed  outcomes, we include a dummy for villages  where households have
the  rights  to  transfer  their  land  (table  2  columns  2,  3, 5, and 6).  Furthermore,  we  include  the share  of
households in the village (excluding the household under concern) who engaged in land rental 3 years ago
as well as  an equally  defined  dummy  for past  land rental participation  by the household under  concern.
While the import;nce of nghts is self-evident,  more active land markets at the village level would indicate
that institutional  arrangements  to facilitate such exchange (e.g.  contract enforcement)  are in place and that
barriers to information (e.g. on supply of land andl rental prices) that might otherwise impede participation
are  lower.'° We  find  that  all  three  variables  are  hlghly  significant  and  of large  magnitude.  Granting
transfer nghts to individual households  would, at the mean of all other variables,  increase the probability
of participating  in rental  market by between  5 and 9 percentage  points  (column 3  and 2)."  Having  one
fourth  of the  households  in  the  village  participate  in  rental  markets  would  increase  the  probability  of
rental market participation  by about 4.5  percentage  points while households  who had rented land  in the
pasi are 20%  mo;-e likely to be observed renting again in the present. The  equations also suggest that both
administrative  and  market reallocation  of lancd  provide  land to  younger  households,  something  that is
easily explained  given  that age  is easily observable.  One notes,  however,  that markets  may do  so more
effectively.  Land markets  also appear  to  transfer land to  those with  higher levels  of agricultural  assets.
Over  and  above  these  factors,  few  of the  hoLisehold  level  variables  included  in  the  regressions  are
significant.
"S  While past rental market participation  is partly endogenous, it ahlo  indicates that the household has expenence  with  the processes  involved  and
had an opportunity to develop  a reputation  that is likely to increase  the probability of obtaining land  in the future.
\iote that the coefficients for the probit regression are marginal  eiTects evaluated at the mean of all other variables
17It has often been noted that, especially in situations where  economic  distortions or non-economic  factors
such as prestige  cause households  to amass  large areas of land which, without  these factors, they would
not be able  to utilize productively,  considering  demand without reference  to the potential  supply of land
will be of limited policy relevance (Binswanger  et al.  1995).  The truncation of the sample arising from the
fact  that some  of the  households  renting out may  have migrated  out and thus  not  been  present for  the
survey is  likely to imply  lower quality of information which might  negatively affect the precision of the
resulting  estimates.  Table  3 reports  the  results  from  estimating  identical  equations  for the  households'
participation  on the  supply  side  of the rental  markets  and  the  area  rented  out,  respectively.  In  general
terms,  we note  that  in many  respects  the  coefficients  are just a mirror  image  of what  is observed  for
renting in, suggesting that,  in the case  of China, the importance of such factors is at present quite limited.
First,  and in  line  with what emerged  from the renting-in equations,  we  find that it is  indeed  households
with higher per capita  endowments  and lower productive efficiency  who tend to rent out land, suggesting
that there  seems  to be little incentive  for accumulation  of unproductive  land.  Second,  while most of the
other household  composition  variables,  in particular  age and education of the head,  are insignificant,  we
note that households  with higher levels  of agricultural  assets  are less likely to rent  out while those with
higher levels of non-agricultural  assets  are significantly more likely to rent out their land.  This suggests
not only that, but with increasing asset accumulation  outside of the agncultural sector, the supply of land
to the rental market is likely to increase.
Village  level  variables  point  towards  within-  rather  than  across-village  rental  (as  these  are  just  the
households  who were found in the  village at the time of the survey).  While we find a weakly  significant
coefficient on per capita income  in the village  that is consistent  with what was observed  on the demand
side,  we  note  that a  more  significant  force  driving  supply of land  to the  rental  market  is  the  share of
households  in the village who denve their main  source of livelihood from non-agricultural  sources.  This
points towards the importance  of diversification.  The clear indication  that diversification  of the economic
base is conducive to the development of land rental markets could have important policy implications.
Concerming the transaction cost variables introduced earlier,  the high significance of the households'  past
rental  expenence  could imply  the existence  of an  agricultural  ladder.  At the same time  we note that the
transfer nght variable  is insignificant  (though  have the right positive  sign).  This unexpected  result  could
be  due to the data  biased problem  that we  discussed before.  Finally, we  note  that the activity of land
rental markets at the village level has less impact on households'  willingness to supply land to the market.
4.2 Obstacles  to market development  and their relevance
The  results  reported  above  suggest  not  only  that  rental  markets  perform  an  important  function  in
transferring  land to poor and more productive  producers,  but also that they are superior to administrative
18reallocation  of land  in transferring  land to  more productive  producers. This makes it  of great interest  to
explore in more (letait  the extent to which barriers on either the demand or the  supply side might prevent
rental markets from achieving their full potential.
To  (1o  so,  we use  information  on households'  desired land rental  participation,  both at prevailing  market
pr ces as well as at prices that are half of what is observed in the market that is availab[le  from the survey.
The  justification  for  the  latter  is  that  better  development  of  off-farm  labor  markets,  as  well  as
hberalization  of  grain  markets  in  China  both  are  likely  to  reduce  rental  prices.  On  the  one  hand,
de velopment of off-farm labor  markets  would lead a greater share of households  with  low ability to exit
agriculture,  thus increasing  the supply  of land  to the rental  market.  On the other hand,  it is  quite  likely
that liberalization  of grain  markets would reduce grain prices  and thus returns from most of agricultural
cultivation (Huang et al. 2001;  Johnson 2000) and thus reduce the equilibrium rental rate.
Figure  I provides  a non-parametric  illustratiion of' households'  actual and desired demand for land rental
in mu against their agricultural  ability." 1 The dotted lines (at the bottom) refer to observed rentals whereas
the  thin  line  refers  to  the  desired  amount cf land  rental.  The  figures  illustrate  that the amount  of land
rented  increases with households'  ability,  although  the  difference,  especially  for actually  rented land,  is
not  significant  statistically. More  importantly,  for  all but the households  with the lowest  level of ability,
there  is significant  rationing in  land rental rnarkets  in the  sense  that the  desired amount of land rental is
significantly higher  than what  is  actually rentect  in. Given that  the difference  increases  with ability,  the
non-parametnc  evidence  suggests  that  reducing  the  level  of credit  rationing  would  be associated  with
higher levels of overall productivity,  a result whichl  we explore below.
Results from repeating the parametnc  regressions  reported earlier with households' desired  rather level of
land rental participation  as  the dependent variable  are reported  in table 3. We note that, compared to the
actual  operation  ef rental  markets,  households'  desired  level  of rental  at current  or lower prices would
strengthen  the  redlistributive  element  inherent  in  markets  by  transferring  land  to  those  with  lower
endowments.  At the same time, removal  of barriers  to the  functioning of rental markets,  and in particular
a reduction  of the equilibnum rental  rale, are likely to promote greater  efficiency.  To give a quantitative
illustration,  the difference  in predicted rental  market participation  between the most and the least efficient
producer  in the  sample would  widen by 6  percentage  points  in the unconstrained  case  at  market pnces
(making  the  most  efficient  producer  40%  more  likely  to  participate  in  rental  markets  than  the  least
efficient one,  everything  else  constant).  It would  increase by a  further 32  percentage  points to the most
12 The  graph  is  based  on  the  results of nonparametric  regression  or locally  weighted  least  square  (Deaton  1999)  A biweight  kernel  with a
bandwidth of 05 is used throughout.  Bootstrapped conlidence  intervals with 2 standard error are added to illustrate the significance of differences
between the two measures
19efficient producer having  a 72%  higher chance  of land rental market  participation  than the least efficient
one, in the case of a reduction of the rental rate by one third.
As indicated in colurnns (3)  and (4) of table 4, a reduction in the land rental rate is likely to be associated
with a  number of other  interesting  features.  It  would  contribute  to  generational  change  by allowing  a
higher share of young households with higher levels of agricultural  assets  to obtain access to land. Also,
households with past migration experience  or with  an off-farm job are significantly less likely  to rent in
land,  suggesting that a mechanism  of self-selection  is  at work whereby  households  with higher level  of
non-agricultural  ability  who have  the chance  of doing  so will  pursue  activities  in the  non-agricultural
sector, thereby giving way to the development of rental markets.
The  regression  for  hypothetical  supply  of land  to  the  rental  market  at  current  prices  supports  these
conclusions.  Companng  with  the  results  obtained  earlier  (table  3),  and  in  line  with  what  had been
observed  in the  descriptive  statistics,  we  observe not only a large  extent of unrealized  "desired"  rentals
but  also  a  significant  difference  in  the  characteristics  between  those  who  actually  supply  land  to  the
market and those who would like to do so in an unconstrained  environment.  In addition to confirming the
endowment-equalization  and efficiency-enhancing  impacts  of better  functioning of land rental  markets as
discussed earlier,  we note that households  with higher  levels of education, past  off-farm job experience,
and higher levels of non-farm enterprise assets,  are all more likely to supply land to the rental market.
Assessment  of the  supply response  in rental  markets  leads to  three policy implications.  First,  and most
importantly, by comparing the coefficients  between  the actual and the hypothetical  regression for renting
out,  it  is  possible  to identify  the  characteristics  of potential  suppliers  who are  constrained  in  existing
markets.  This  suggests  that more educated  households with  off-farm jobs and significant levels  of non-
farm assets are most likely to be constrained  on the supply side. Although our regressions  can not help in
the identification  of policies that would  make  it easier for these  households to  supply land to the rental
market, further research  in this area might be warranted.  Second,  greater diversification  and development
of off-farm labor markets  will increase  the amount of land transacted  in rental  markets, thereby allowing
efficient producers  with limited  endowments to gain  access to greater amounts of land that could, in turn,
also facilitate  the establishment  of greater farm sizes.
From  a  policy  perspective,  it  is  of particular  interest  to  identify  factors  that  prevent  producers  from
renting  out  land.  To  do  so,  we  identify  producers  who  are  participation  or  area  constrained,  i.e.  who
would like to participate  in rental markets  (or participate more)  but do not actually do so at present.  This
illustrates  that between  9%  and  10%  of all producers  are  supply constrained in this  way, a figure  that
varies  very  little  across  the  three  provinces.  Regressing  a  dummy  for whether  or not  a household  is
constrained  in rental  markets  on  a number of variables  of potential  relevance  suggests  that households
20with off- farm jobs and higher levels  of education are likely  to be more constrained.  At the village level, a
histry of past reallocation  increases  the probability of households being constrained.  This suggests  that,
in  oddition  to raising  awareness  about  the  scope  of rental  markets  especially  among  those  households
engaged  in  the  off-farrn labor  market,  t may  be  useful  for  policy-makers  at the  local  level  to  provide
assurance  that renting  otut will not be taken as a signal for land redistribution.
4.3 Quantifying potential gains from improved  lunctioning of land rental markets
Although  results  thus  far  suggest  that  better  development  of  rental  markets  is  ikely  to  lead  to
considerable  productivity  gains,  they  fail  to provide any  indication  for the potential  rnagnitude  of such
gains  To explore this,  we provide,  in table 5, the expected gain  in individual  and social benefits based on
predicted  partlcipD.tlon  rates  from the  earlier  regressions,  together  with  the  coefficients  from  a  Cobb-
Douglas  producticn  finction  estimatec,  on  the  2000 data.  A number of steps  are  used  to  compare  the
po ential  benefits  fron  iland reallocation  as  compared to the case  of autarky  for four clifferent  scenarios.
These  scenanos  aie  on-'ly administrative  reallocation  (column  I of table 5),  only land rentals observed  in
reality (column 2,  desired rental  at the current and reduced land rental (columns 3 and 4, respectively).
Tle steps  involved  in  constructing  these figures  are  as follows:  First,  participation  in  rental  markets is
pr'-dicted based  oll a cut-off value of 0.5 in the respective probit regression  (figures are shown in row 2).i3
We  assume  that  households  above  this cut-off will rent  in  the median  value observed  in the  sample  in
order  to  obtain  a conservative  estimate  of the  impact  of transferability  of land.'4 The  predicted  higher
level  of  land  used,  together  with  a  proportionlal  increase  in  material  inputs  is  then  entered  in  the
pioduction function  to obtain a predicted level  of'output (row 4).t5 This allows us to obtain the percentage
irciease  mn  production  (row  5) as  compared  to the  benchmark  without land  transfers  (row  3). To obtain
tie expected inci vase  in production for the whole  economy (row 6), it is necessary to multiply the gain in
p-oduction  per producer  with the predlcted  increase  in participation.  To  transform this  increase  in gross
output  into  a  net  social  gain,  it is  necessary  to  subtract  the  opportunity  cost of the resources  used.  To
obtain a conservative  estimate of this gain (row  B),  we assume the opportunity cost of land to be given by
the market rental  for paddy land'6 whereas  the cost for other material  inputs is given by their market rate.
/s  a result,  we  c)btain  the percentage  increase  in net social  benefit (row 9)  as compared to a  situation of
aularky  for the scenanos indicated  in the columnrs of table 5.
All  rows mentioned  here and below refer  to table 5
According  to the regressions,  the amount  of land rented in wOu Id be higher than the average and,  furthermnore,  increase in a producer's  level of
hbiiity  Thus the proc,:dure applied  will result in a lower bound  of the imrpact of land transfer
"While  we let the  purchased matenal  inputs  vary proporulonately  with the size of operational land,  we hold labor and draft aninal constant
"Ve  use the  rental rate  for paddy only rather than aggregate land,  Based on our data, about 47% rental participating  households rented in paddy
land  only  or 65%  rer led  both paddy  and upland  On  average,  the  rental  rate  for paddy  is 204 yuan/mu  while it is only  59 yuan/mu  for upland
(very  few rental  iate-,  on  upland  were  reported)  Note  that this  is a conservative  estimate since,  as  demonstrated  in our analysis,  it is the less
prc,ductive mdividuals who  A-ill be renting out land
21From  a substantive  point of view,  the  results  demonstrate  that all  of scenarios  increase  production  but
point  towards  significant differences  in  the  magnitude  of this  effect,  with  the  gains  from unobstructed
operation  of rental  markets  by  far  outweighing  those  that  are  in  reality  achieved  by  administrative
reallocation.  With only 4.7%  of the producers participating in exchange of land, the increase  in output and
gain  in  net  social  benefit  achieved  by  reallocation  are  predicted  to  be significantly  lower than  what is
realized by actual operation of rental markets  (from 0.8%  to 3.2%). Furthermore,  unconstrained  operation
of rental  markets,  i.e.  allowing  households  to  obtain  their desired  level  of renting  at  the current pnce,
would lead to more than doubling of the net social  gain (from  3.2% to 7.2%).  Reducing  the  transaction
costs associated with  land markets  together with a fall in rental pnce would not only be associated with a
considerable  increase in the rate of participation  to 32%  of the farming  population but also lead to a gain
in  social  welfare  that  is  more  than  twenty  times  larger  than  what  is  achieved  by reallocation.  Taken
together,  our evidence  thus  suggests  that  direct redistribution  alone  will  be  less  and  less  adequate  as  a
means to maintain an optimal operational  land distnbution  and that considerable gains can be achieved by
better functioning  of land rental  markets.  To the  extent  that village  leaders'  prohibition  or  approval  of
these  markets  does  have  a  clear  effect  on  observed  outcomes,  as  suggested  by  earlier  regressions,
decentralized  measures  to highlight the scope for land transfers could improve rental market  functioning,
thereby  increasing  productivity  and ensuring that China's  equitable  land  ownership distnbution  will  be
most efficiently utilized.
5. Conclusion  and policy  implications
We  started  this paper  by noting the  dearth  of empirical  investigations  of land  rental  markets  in China,
despite  the  growing  importance  that  such markets  are  likely to  have  in  the  future.  The  results reported
allow us to draw a number of conclusions.
First, even  in some  of the poorest provinces  of China, rental markets have  emerged rapidly over the  last
decade  and are  now consistently  more  important as  a means  for land redistnbution  than  administrative
reallocation.17 Our regressions  suggest that both the redistributive  and the efficiency-enhancing  impact of
land  rental  markets  exceed  that  of administrative  land  reallocation  and that  the role  of such markets  is
likely to increase with diversification of income sources, out-migration,  increased levels of education,  and
accumulation  of capital  in non-farm  enterprises.  Contrary  to fears that land rental  markets might lead  to
accumulation  of land  in the hands of the nch and powerful,  greater emphasis  on markets  as  compared  to
'7  This  is  consistent  with  the  expenence  from  transition  economies  where,  once  allowed,  rental  markets  assumed  great  importance  even  in
situations where the final ownership status of land was not yet clanfied.
22administrative  realilocation  would provide  greater benefits to poor but efficient  producers who have  few
alternative opportunities for using their labor endowment.
Although  we  find  that  administrative  amd  rental  markets  work  in  the  same  direction,  the  scope  for
administrative reallocation to attain an optimum allocation of land appears  to be affected by informational
constraints.  In addition,  the large number of produces who would be willing to participate  in land rental
markets even at curTent prices but do not do so at this point suggests that there are other barriers which,  at
present, prevent  China from fully enjoying the benefits that would  be associated  with unhindered rental
market  operation.  Graphical  representation  as  well  as  econometric  evidence  highlight  the  scope  for
enhancing  the  operation  of  such  markets  and  That  prohibition  by  village  leaders  has  a  clear  effect.
Simulations, based on the production function  estimated earlier, allow us to quantify the potential benefits
in tenns of production. Operation  of rental markets at the level  desired by households  would double the
share of households  participating  and achieve  aln-lost ten times the benefits obtained  from administrative
reallocation.  Reducing  the  rental  price  would  letad  to  further  increases  in  participation  and  social  net
benefits.
Given  evidence  of a  strong  impact of titling  on  land  values  and  land use  through  improved  access  to
credit and easier marketability of land  (Feder  et al.  1986,  Carter and Olinto  1996,  Alston et al.  1995 and
1996,  Lopez  1999),  a  large  literature  has  focused on land  titling  as a  key  land policy  intervention  and
aimed to find evidence  of an impact of this on credit access. The  evidence  presented here illustrates  that,
even  in the absence  of full marketability,  increasing  the transferability  of land can lead to sizeable  social
benefits.  Whether  adding full marketability  of lanld  could provide  additional  benefits  (as  argued by Li,
2002),  and/or how these benefits would compare to the possible social cost, can not be answered  with our
data but would be in important area for future research.
23Table 1.  Descriptive evidence  on households'  rental market participation
Total  Hunan  Guizhou  Yunnan
1. Participation in rental markets
Share of households benefiting  from redistnbution (1995-2001)  5.4%  22.4%  0 7%  3  1%
Share who rented in land 5 years ago (1996)  2.3%  3 8%  1 6%  2.7%
Share who rent in land now  9.4%  14.3%  6  1%  13.2%
Share willing to rent in at current rental  22.4%  30.5%  17.1%  28 9%
Share willing to rent in at 2/3 of current rental  34.8%  40 5%  29.4%  44.2%
Share renting out land  3.2%  3.8%  4  1%  0.0%
Share willing to rent out land at current rental  13.9%  14 3%  15 9%  8  1%
Share willing to rent out land at 3/2 of current rental  25.5%  22.9%  30 0%  15 7%
2. Area transacted (mu)
Area change through reallocation  (1995 -2001)  0.088  0 294  0 016  0 071
Area actually rented in  0.191  0350  0 126  0.204
Area willing to rent in at current rental  0.663  0.904  0.447  1.013
Area willing to rent in at 2/3 of current rental  1.509  1 576  1.088  2 625
Area actually rented out  0 055  0 060  0 072  0.000
Area willing to rent out at current rental  0 345  0 322  0 403  0.230
Area willing to rent out at 3/2 times current rental rate  0.743  0 604  0 891  0.476
3.  Inequality of the land distribution
Gini before adjustment  0 3751  03462  03796  0 3877
Gini after adjustment  0 3658  03195  03755  03793
Gini of real operation  land  0  3713  0.3180  0.3871  0 3724
Gini of desired operation land  0 3940  03414  04078  03995
Gin, of desired operation land at low rental pnce  0 3864  03224  03714  0 4586
Source. own computation  from 2001  Household survey
24Tabl  2:  Determinants of receipt of land through adrministrative vs.  marked-based reallocation
Participation  durrmmy (probit)  Area received (tobit)
Admn.  Market  Admin.  Market
Per capital  arable land endowment  -0.006'**  -0.085***  -0.050***  -2.403***  -1.876***  -1.232***
(5.29)  (4.33)  (3.90)  (4.23)  (4.21)  (3.19)
Agric  Production  ability  0 003**  0  1122***  0.079***  0.948  2.698***  2 009***
(2.22)  (3.70)  (3.30)  (1.34)  (3.91)  (3.39)
Head s age  -0000***  -0 002*  -0.002**  -0.061 **  -0.042  -0.045*
(2.6-7)  (1.78)  (2.37)  (2.23)  (1.58)  (1.83)
Heads education  0.000  -0.001  -0003  0.115  -0.035  -0.076
(1.33)  (0.33)  (1.04)  (I 35)  (0.44)  (1.04)
HH population  14 - 60 years  -0.001 **  -0 009  -0 001  -0 321  -0.127  0.074
(2.2 1)  (0.87)  (0.19)  (1.35)  (0.61)  (0.40)
HH population  > 60 years  -0 0(0  -0.029  -0.005  0.032  -0.611  -0.090
(0.50)  (1.46)  (0.33)  (0 08)  (1.48)  (0.25)
HH population  < 14 yeErs  -0.001  -0.007  -0.011  -0.271  -0.109  -0.209
(1.483)  (0 57)  (1.15)  (0.94)  (0.39)  (0.81)
Value of draft ani & ag assets (log)  0 000  0 007**  0 005*  0.030  0. 167**  0. 136**
(0.54)  (1.98)  (1.91)  (0.40)  (2.35)  (2.15)
Non-faim assets (log)  o.oco  -0.002  -0.006*  0 058  -0.051  -0.128*
(0.43)  (0.62)  (1.89)  (0.79)  (0.63)  (1.73)
Head' has myugration  expenence  -0 001  -0.017  -0.002  -0.504  -0.595  -0.335
(0.5 5)  ,0.55)  (0 07)  (0.79)  (0.90)  (0 58)
Head has off-farm job expenence  0 00,5*  .0.034  -0 018  1.042  -0.676  -0 255
(1.85)  '0.88)  (0.64)  (1.40)  (0.78)  (0.33)
Village per capita incorne  (log)a  0 004***  -0.045*  -0 037  1.597***  -0.943  -0.814
(3.46)  (1 70)  (1.51)  (2.91)  (1.47)  (1.36)
Hh depend  on agnc.  in village (%)b  0  000  0.001  0.000  0 002  0.009  0.002
(0.52)  (0.86)  (0.49)  (0.14)  (0.57)  (0.13)
Guiz,iou dummy  -0.074***  -0  116***  -0.024  -5.583***  -2.415***  -0.651
(8.02)  (4 20)  (1.10)  (6.19)  (4.28)  (1.29)
Yuniian dummy  -0.005***  -0.060**  -0 015  -2.974***  -1.751**  -0.497
(4.59)  (2.04)  (0.59)  (3.99)  (2.40)  (0.77)
Renting allowed by village  leaders  0 090***  0.048**  2.415***  1.363*
(3 36)  (2 10)  (2.81)  (1.74)
Shar-  of hhs in  village renting  0161***  3.245***
(4.28)  (3.53)
Household's past renting experience  0.197***  4.401 ***
_____  _____________  __________________________  (10.99)  (9.14)
No  of observations  942  902  902  942  902  902
Pseudo-R2  0.41  0 10  0.38  0.28  0.07  0.23
Robust z statistics in parentheses
signi icantat  10%,  **significantat5%;  ***  signifcantat  1%
25Table 3: Determinants of renting land out
Specification
Participation (probit)  Area rented out (tobit)
Per capital  land endowment  0.016**  0.016**  1.155**  1.139**
(2.22)  (2.26)  (2.31)  (2.29)
Agnc.  Production ability  -0.068***  -0.066***  -4.962**  -4.801**
(2.92)  (2.91)  (2  48)  (2.43)
Head's age  0.001  0.001  0.042  0.045
(0.81)  (0 82)  (0.96)  (1.01)
Head's education  -0 000  -0.000  -0 060  -0.073
(0 14)  (0 29)  (0.43)  (0.52)
HH population  14 - 60 years  -0.003  -0.002  -0.097  -0.092
(0 50)  (0.45)  (0.25)  (0.24)
HH population > 60 years  0.001  0.001  0.041  0.045
(0 09)  (0.15)  (0.05)  (0.06)
HH population < 14 years  0.003  0.002  0.186  0.151
(0.34)  (0.26)  (0.36)  (0.29)
Value of draft ani & ag assets (log)  -0.002  -0 002  -0.129  -0.113
(1.45)  (1.34)  (0.99)  (0.87)
Non-farm assets (log)  0.005***  0.005***  0.389***  0.370***
(3.34)  (3.20)  (2 97)  (2.85)
Head' has migration expenence  0.027*  0.028*  1.629  1.650
(1.68)  (1.75)  (1.42)  (1.45)
Head has off-farm job experience  0015  0.013  0.818  0.692
(0.89)  (0.78)  (0.64)  (0.54)
Village per capita income (log)  0.006  0.005  0.396  0 254
(0.47)  (0.42)  (0.35)  (0.22)
Share of hhs depending on agric.  in village (%)  -0.001 **  -0 001 **  -0.042*  -0.041 *
(2.48)  (2.50)  (1 80)  (1.77)
Renting allowed by village leaders  0.025  0 023  2.882  2.777
(I  24)  (1.12)  (1.39)  (1.37)
Share of hhs in village renting  -0.032  -3.048
(0.98)  (1.25)
Household's past renting experience  0 031 *  *  *  1.834*
(2 60)  (1.81)
No  of observations  902  902  902  902
Pseudo-R2  0.14  0 15  0 09  0.10
Robust z statistics  in parentheses
significant  at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *'  significant at  1%
26Table  4::  Determinants of hypothetical rental decisions
Renting in  Renting out
Current village renital  Rental  reduced by 33%  Current village rental
Participation  Area rented  Participation  Area rented  Parl icipation  Area rented
Per capita land endowment  -0.I5i***  -1.6946**  -0.132***  -1.910***  0.035**  0.833***
(4.19)  (4.11)  (4.58)  (3.68)  (2.22)  (2.74)
Agric  efficiency  0.134***  2.0694'**  0.239***  4.027***  .0.095*  -1.886**
(2.85)  (2.84)  (4.03)  (4.09)  (1.91)  (2.34)
Head's  age  -0.003*  -0.1)37  -0.005**  -0.086**  0.001  0.008
(1.88)  (1.36i)  (2.56)  (2.33)  (0.38)  (0.31)
Head's education  -0.004  -0.06M6  -0 005  -0.059  0.009**  0.135*
(0.85)  (0.81)  (0.85)  (0.55)  (2.20)  (1.68)
HH population 14-60 years  -0.014  -0.133  0.003  0.199  -0.003  0.034
(1.00)  (0.6;!)  (0.20)  (0.69)  (0.26)  (0.16)
HH population > 60 years  -0.040  -0.7416*  -0.044  -0.827  0.017  0.343
(1.42)  (1.75)  (1.34)  (1.48)  (0.78)  (0.83)
HH population  <  14 years  0.003  0.185  0.027  0.467  -0.010  -0.175
(0.15)  (0.65i)  (1.24)  (1.21)  (0.64)  (0.59)
Value of ag assets (log)  0.016***  0.27611**  0.01 1**  0.273***  -0.002  -0.015
(3.33)  (3-74)  (2.06)  (2.84)  (0.53)  (0.21)
Non-farm  assets (log)  -0.004  -0.019  -0.010  -0.068  0.008*  0.151**
(0.72)  (0.2:1)  (1.59)  (0.61)  (1.92)  (1.96)
Head  rruigr.  Experience  -0.048  -0.686  -0.134***  -2.223**  0.039  0.681
(I  10)  (0.98i)  (2.62)  (2.29)  (1.05)  (1.03)
Head  w. off-farm exp.  -0.071  -1.U0  -0.083  -2.182*  0.136***  1.923***
(1.33)  (1.5/i)  (1.24)  (1.79)  (2.97)  (2.62)
Share ofhhs depending on agric.  -0.026  -0.205  -0.064  -1.091  0.002  -0.101
in village (%)  (0.64)  (0.34)  (1.33)  (1.37)  (0.06)  (0.16)
Village per capita  incorne (log)  0001  0.012  0.001  0.005  -0.002**  -0.038**
(0.99)  (0.7:5)  (0.52)  (0.22)  (2.55)  (2.51)
Guizhou dummy  -0.137***  -2.163***  -0.120***  -1.941**  0.057*  1.201**
(3.57)  (3.69)  (2.62)  (2.47)  (1.87)  (2.03)
Yunnan  dumfimy  -0.062  -0.6118  -0.043  0 573  0.016  0.424
(1.34)  (0.80)  (0.72)  (0.55)  (0.37)  (0.49)
Renting allowed by village leaders  0.055  0.89'8  0.042  0.578  0.011  0.165
_____  (1.30)  (12.5)  (0.80)  (0.63)  (0.29)  (0.22)
No. of observations  902  902  902  902  902  902
Log-likelihod  -449.37  -879.98  -534.35  -1359.65  -343.56  -590.56
Robust z statistics in parentheses
*  signi ficant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; ***  significant at 1%
27Table 5.  Social and individual gains from better functioning rental markets
Reallocation  Real renting  Desired renting  Desired renting at
at current rental  2/3 of current
price  rental price
Actual participation  rate  5.6%  10%  23%  35%
Predicted participation  rate  4.7%  12.4%  20.6%  32.1%
Benchmark production  (yuan)  1807  1663  1824  1772
Production after non-market/market land transfer  (yuan)  2577  2588  3125  3462
Individual  production gain (%)  42%  56%  71%  95%
Social production gain (%)  2.0%  6.9%  14.7%  31.5%
Net social benefit after rental (yuan)  17  62  144  348
Net social benefit after rental and material  costs (yuan)'  10  41  89  211
Percentage gain  in net social benefit  (%/.)  0.8%  3.2%  7.2%  17.1.0%
The net benefit would be much bigger if we use the rental rate for aggregated land rather than for paddy only; Based on our data, about
47% rental participating  households rented in paddy land only or 65% rented both paddy and upland.
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30Figure 3: Distribution of agricultural ability  in different provinces
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31Annex  1: Proofs for main propositions
Proposition 1.  Among the households  who rent out land, the higher their ability, a, the less likely they will rent out.
Alternatively,  among households who rent in land, the higher a, the more likely they are to rent in.
Tc,tal differentiating both sides of (5) or (7)  with respect to a (again,  i is ignored  for notation simplicity),  yields:
X., (I  , A) + pa(  f  ..  + A  )  = 0
Total differentiation of both sides, of (6) or (8) with respect to a, yields:
pfA (Ii;, Ai) + pa(f  a  + fAla  a)  0
From the first equation, we obtain  al  laa  substituting this into 'he  second equation gives:
aA  fAI  f,'  -fA  fil.  _  fAafl  fAf  >  (Al)
da  a(fAAMf,..  fAInf,aA)  a[fAAfpt,  (f  AI.)  ]
This implies  that for all households that participate  in rental  markets (on either side),  the amount  of area operated
will increase with ability.
For households  renting in, the amount of land rented in is the difference between the amount of operational land and
the land endowment,  i.e.  A1n = A-A  (A2).
aA  aA
Total differentiation of both sides of (A2) with respect to  a, yields  m = - > 0, implying  that for households
dcta  aa
who rent in land, the amount of land rented in is increasing  in agricultural ability.  Total differentiation of both sides
aAA
of (A2) with respect to  A  , yield  -a-* = _1 < 0,  implying that for the households that rent in land, the amount of
aA
land rented in is strictly decreasing  in land endowment.
For those households that rent out land, the amount of land rented out is the difference between the land endowment
and the land used for self-cultivation,  or formally,  A,,,  = A-A  (A3).  Total differentiation of both sides of (A3)
with  respect  to  a, yields  = _-  < 0,  which  irnplies  that  for  those  households  who  rent  out  land,  the
L9a  8a
amount of land rented out will decrease in agricultural ability. Total differentiation  of both sides of (A3) with respect
to A,  yields  -'  = 1 > 0  (for by assumption,  individual household's  operational  land, A  is not constrained by
32individual household's endowment), implying thai  for those households  who rent out land, the amount rented out is
strictly increasing  in land endowment.
Proposition  2. Presence of transaction  costs drives a wedge  between those renting in and those renting out with any
increase  in  T decreasing  al and  increasing  a:,, thereby  expanding  the range of producers  who remain  in  autarky,
reducing the nurnber of households  whc  participate  in rental  markets, and increasing the amount of land transacted
through rental markets.
Totally differentiating  both sides of equation (7) and (8) with respect to T, yields
ala  aA
pl  +  a  paf,,A  =  T
ala  aA
and pafA,,- + pafM  - -=-1
We obtain aa /  from the first equation and substitute it into the second equation, which yields
aA  -1 L
AT  Pa[fAAf,a,.  -(fla  )  ]
Equation (A4) irnplies that households that rent in will operate less land as the transaction cost increases.
aAi.  _  A
T'otal differentiation of both sides of (A2)  with respect to  T yields  - < 0,  implying that households  that
still rent in land will rent in less as the transaction cost increases.
l'otally differentiating both sides of equation (5) and (6) with respect to T and rearranging terms yields:
1  > 0  (A5) ,9T  pa[fiAtl  2)l  D 
E  quation (A5)  implies that households in the renting in pool will operate less  land as the transaction cost increases.
Total  differentiation  of both  sides  of  (A3)  with  respect  to  T, yields  M"  =  a-A  < 0,  which  implies  that aT  a
households who still rent out land will  rent out less  as the transaction  cost increases.
For households  who continue to rent in,  the optimal operational land holding can be obtained from equation (7)  and
(8) as  A,  = A, (a,  p, r, T, w).  Setting A,  to  A,,  yields the identity
Ai  = A, (a,, p, r,  T, w)  (A6)
33- Oa I  A.
Totally differentiating both sides, yields,  dAi  = -i-  dca, + aT dT = 0  (for  dA,  = 0)
8Ai
daT  -a  >0  (A7)  (for  'a'  >0 from (Al) and  'A'  <0from (A4)), implying
dT  8Ai  a  aT
Oa
that as the transaction costs  increase more households would change  from renting in land to autarky.
Similarly for the households  that continue  to rent out  land,  and based  on (5) and  (6), we can derive  the  following
proposition:
2Ai
daT  =-aT <0  (A8)  (for  '  > 0from (Al) and  'A'  >0from(A5))implying
dT  Ai  aT
a
that, as transaction costs increase, more households would change  from renting out to autarky.
Proposition 3.  Increases  in the exogenously given wage for off-farm employment will increase  the amount of land
transacted  in rental  markets by increasing  the amount rented  out by households with low agricultural  ability (who
join the  off-farm  labor force)  and  the amount rented  in by those  with high-ability  (who specialize  in agricultural
production).  This will be associated  with a decrease in the equilibrium rental rate which,  in a risk-free  environment,
will make everybody better off.
Without loss of generality,  we assume that only the households that originally rented  land out will take advantage  of
the increased  off-farm opportunities.  Those who rented in land originally will continue to  rent in land and their off-
farm opportunities  are  assumed  to  remain the  same  as before.  In other  words,  households  who  rented  out land
before  will face  wage increase while those  who rented  in land before will  face the same wage with the increase  of
the overall off-farm opportunities.
For those households  who  rented out land, we take  the derivative  of both sides of equation (5) or equation (6)  with
respect to w, yield
Pq[AB,  a  +JP(nZfMO=  p  afl.  all + paf,i  aA =1°
ar  w alwa
Obtain  al  /w  from the second  equation and substitute it into the first equation, resulting in Orw
~34OA  fAI  < °  (A9)
aw  pa[(fA,.  ffl  3A  ]
which  implies  that  households  who  rented  out  land  will  use  even  less  endowment  for  self-cultivation
and A0U 1 = A _ A  =>  = _  > 0,  implying  that amount of land  rented  out  by individual  household  is
increasing in its off-farm  opportunity and, as a consequence,  aggregate  supply of land increases.
If we  also  assurme  that off-farm  opportumities  will  not  affect  those  households  that  originally  rented  in,  greater
supply of land due to increases  in the wage rate will  lead to a decrease  in rental rate.  To show this informally,  let
a.,,,  ==a.  (a,  ,...,  t,,p,w  ,r*,T)be the aggregate  rent-in  curve,  and let  a,,., =a0,,(a 1,...a,,p,w"',r*,T)be
the aggregate  rent-out  curve. At equilibrium,  set arnount of land rented in equals  the amount:  of land rented out,  or
atn (al,,..  a,,p,  w',  r*,T)=a."t(a,, ..a.......l,,p,W''"t,r*,T)  ...... (AIO)
Total differentiating both sides of  (AIO) by allowing r*  and w0" to vary, yields:
aa,w  r(
*'a  dr  ,  aart dr * + aa°ou  dwou'  reantnge terms, we will have-,  =  O,  (AI 1) ar  *  dr  &dOu  dw  <aa.  aa°,ut
ar*  ar*
It  is  easy  to  show  that  the  sign  of (All)  is  negative.  We  know  IAo.  t  >  =>O  aaou  > 0  aaln <0  and 8w  8  r*
Out  > 0 , and we just showed that the  equilibritmt  rental rate falls as the off-farm opportunities  increase. eir *
To show the aggregate rent-in and rent-cut curve gnaphically,  we will have:
r  oind
/  \  (due to increase  in off-farm opportunities)
r*  a"ne
/  \  ~~~~~~~aout  old  =  aout  new
_  __a,  a..,
a  a
35Again, as the off-farm opportunities increases, the equilibrium rental rate falls while the amount of land transacted in
the market increases.
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